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Abstract 
This paper addresses the questions of whether and why political parties respond to media-covered 
street protests. To do so, it adopts an agenda-setting approach and traces issue attention in protest 
politics and parliament over several years in four West European countries (France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland). The paper innovates in two ways. First, it does not treat the parties 
in parliament as a unitary actor but focuses on the responses of single parties. Second, partisan 
characteristics are introduced that might condition the effect of protest on parliamentary activity. 
More precisely, it assesses the explanatory power of ideological factors (left-right orientation and 
radicalism) and other factors related to issue competition between parties (opposition status, issue 
ownership, and contagion). The results show that parties do respond to street protests in the news, 
and they are more likely to respond if they are in opposition and if their competitors have reacted 
to the issue.  
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Introduction: Studying protest-party interactions between elections 
Political parties and social movements are key actors involved in interest intermediation between 
citizens and the state. Parties and movements might differ in form (organization vs. network), in-
stitutional access (high vs. low) and the main site of activity (parliament vs. ‘the street’), but both 
articulate societal interests and make publicly visible demands on behalf of a constituency. There-
fore, it seems counterproductive that, since the 1980s, research on social movements and protest 
has become increasingly disconnected from mainstream political science in general and the study 
of parties and elections in particular. However, due to both scholarly attention cycles and recent 
political events, such as the rise of movement parties in southern Europe, there have been new 
attempts to bridge this gap (e.g. della Porta et al., forthcoming; Hutter and Kriesi, 2013; McAdam 
and Tarrow, 2010, 2013). These are giving us a more nuanced understanding of how interest inter-
mediation works and the roles that social movements and protests play in the process. 
The present paper is another effort to bridge this gap. By adopting an agenda-setting ap-
proach, we examine the effects of media-covered street protests on the issue attention of parties. 
Our research questions are as follows. Do political parties in their parliamentary questions respond 
to the issues addressed in protests? If so, which factors determine the strength of the relationship? 
In contrast to other recent work linking these fields, we do not emphasize elections and electoral 
campaigns as heightened moments of party conflict. Instead, we focus on the interactions between 
protest and political parties in the periods between elections. Furthermore, we focus on issue em-
phasis as a particular element in the strategic toolkit of political parties (for classical accounts, see 
Budge and Farlie, 1983; Carmines and Stimson, 1993; Robertson, 1976). According to this theo-
retical approach, a crucial element of party competition is that parties emphasize issues that benefit 
them electorally while they ignore those that might be potentially harmful. More precisely, we 
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focus on the attention parties pay to issues in parliamentary questions. These parliamentary ques-
tions are argued to be part of the ‘symbolic’ political agenda: they do not have direct policy conse-
quences but are an important way for a party to highlight its priorities and respond to the issues of 
the day (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). Parties might also respond to protests by adapting their 
issue positions or framing strategies, but issue emphasis or ‘getting attention’ seems to be a condi-
tion for these types of response.1  
There is increasing, but still limited, research that adopts such an agenda-setting approach to 
studying movement outcomes (for an overview, see Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2012). These stud-
ies investigate the relationship between the attention devoted to issues by protesters and by other 
political actors, for example parliament or government. The empirical findings are not conclusive. 
Nevertheless, they indicate that (a) there is some agenda-setting effect of protest, and (b) this effect 
is stronger in the early stages of the policy process. However, the studies share a major shortcoming 
as they usually treat parliament or government as unitary actors. In this study, we innovate by 
focusing on the responses of individual political parties, and especially on the way they vary in 
their responses to media-covered protest. 
Furthermore, we innovate by introducing party characteristics that might condition the effect 
of protest on a single party’s parliamentary activity. We draw on related studies that examine 
whether and why parties respond to other types of external signals, such as shifts in public opinion, 
general media attention, or competitor behaviour (e.g. Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen, 2010, 2015; Klüver and Spoon, 2014; Meguid, 2005; Spoon et al., 2014; 
                                                          
1
 However, both accommodative and adversarial responses to claims by challengers might lead to increas-
ing issue attention (Meguid, 2005). Thus, the present paper is not about whether parties support the claims 
of protesters but whether they emphasize the issues addressed in protest politics. 
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Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). These studies show that responsive-
ness depends on, for example, ideological affinity, opposition status or contagion. In the present 
study, we assess two ideological factors (left-right orientation and radicalism) and three additional 
factors related to party issue competition (issue ownership, contagion, and opposition status). We 
scrutinize the explanatory power of these factors by showing whether they affect the extent to 
which parties respond to the particular signals sent by the participants involved in protest events. 
Empirically, our analysis covers several years and four European countries: France (1995-
2005), the Netherlands (1995-2011), Spain (1996-2011), and Switzerland (1995-2003). The data 
on parliamentary questions were collected by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) 
(http://www.comparativeagendas.net; including links to datasets). The protest data were collected 
by the National Political Change in a Globalizing World project (Kriesi et al., 2012). More pre-
cisely, the protest data were collected by means of a quantitative content analysis of protest cover-
age in national quality newspapers. Using media data to assess the activity in the protest arena 
reflects the predominant approach in studies on the agenda-setting power of protest. On the one 
hand, this choice follows a long-standing tradition in social movement research more generally, as 
media (and especially newspapers) offer almost the only source with which to systematically trace 
protest events over longer periods and across different countries (e.g. Earl et al., 2004; Hutter, 
2014a).2 On the other hand, we know that political elites mainly – or as Koopmans (2004) argues, 
even exclusively – get to know about protest through media reporting. Thus, there are good reasons 
                                                          
2 The only alternative is police archives (e.g. Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2012). However, police archives 
are also biased and, most importantly for our research, they are far less comparable (even within a single 
country) and they often contain very limited information on the issues of the protesters as compared to 
media reports. 
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for initiating a study of differentiated party responses to protests by focusing on national news 
coverage. 
Combining the datasets allows us to draw on around 29,000 questions and 4,500 media-cov-
ered protest events for the analysis. The unit of analysis is the attention to a given issue during a 
particular period (here we use months). As observations are not independent of each other (they 
are nested in both parties and issues), we rely on a cross-classified model to test our hypotheses. 
Overall, our results indicate that parties do respond to street protests in their parliamentary ques-
tions, and that they are more likely to respond if they are in opposition and if their competitors have 
reacted to the issue. Once we control for opposition status, left-right orientations no longer signif-
icantly affect parties’ reactions to news coverage of protests. Moreover, we find instances of asso-
ciative issue ownership as the populist radical right systematically responds to the salience of im-
migration in the protest arena. 
 
Who responds? Ideology and party competition 
Previous studies on the agenda-setting effects of protest have been innovative as they allow sys-
tematic examination of movement outcomes across issues and contexts. Walgrave and Vliegenthart 
(2012) present an overview of studies adopting an agenda-setting approach to assessing the impact 
of protest. They list eleven articles published in the period 1978-2010 (Burstein and Freudenberg, 
1978; Costain and Majstorovic, 1994; Soule et al., 1999; McAdam and Su, 2002; Baumgartner and 
Mahoney, 2005; King et al., 2005; Soule and King, 2006; King et al., 2007; Johnson, 2008; Olzak 
and Soule, 2009; Johnson et al., 2010). Most of these indicate that protest – measured by media 
accounts – matters in terms of which issues get emphasized by other actors. When protests over an 
issue increase, political elites start to devote more attention to that issue. This finding raises the 
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question of why other actors (in our case, political parties) should care about the signals sent by 
protesters. As Vliegenthart et al. (2015) argue, protests can be seen as a particular type of infor-
mation communicated to elites about urgent societal problems (Burstein, 1999; Lohmann, 1993). 
The protest signal seems particularly attractive because “it is public and accessible, negative, most 
of the time unambiguous, with a clear evaluative slant, applicable to one’s task, and (for some 
elites) compatible with existing predispositions” (Vliegenthart et al., 2015: 8). Moreover, involve-
ment in protest allows the participants to raise issue-specific concerns, and it shows their commit-
ment due to the fairly high ‘costs’ involved in this form of political participation (e.g. Verba et al., 
1995: 48). Thus, protest – and especially protest that gets into the news – is a strong signal sent by 
a mobilized part of the population. Depending on the strength of the signal, political parties might 
ultimately interpret it even as an electoral threat (Burstein, 1999; Lohmann, 1993; Uba, 2009, 
2016).  
Based on the idea that protest is an informative signal and that its effects depend on the 
characteristics of the signal and the recipient, previous studies have formulated a set of hypotheses. 
For example, it has been shown that protest size matters more than protest frequency (e.g. McAdam 
and Su, 2002), and that protests related to certain issues matter more than others (e.g. Walgrave 
and Vliegenthart, 2012). Regarding the recipients, the existing literature usually compares different 
political agendas (like the parliamentary or governmental agenda). Studies in the US context indi-
cate that protest is especially effective early on in the policy cycle (e.g. King et al., 2005; Soule 
and King, 2006). By contrast, the government seems to react more than parliament in the case of 
Belgium (Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2012). 
However, what studies have so far ignored is the question of why particular political parties 
respond to protest mobilization. By looking at the general parliamentary agenda, they focus on the 
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effect of protest on the party system at large but not on the responses of individual parties. As stated 
initially, in this study we attempt to open the ‘black box’ of parliament and this should allow us to 
get closer to understanding the complex relationship between protest politics and party politics. 
What type of party is most likely to respond to a protest signal reported in the media? In the fol-
lowing, we discuss five such partisan moderators of the agenda-setting influence of protest. 
To begin with, the literature on party responsiveness brings in ideological affinity as an ex-
planatory variable. According to this argument, political parties are more likely to react to issues 
emphasized by competitors within their political camp. For example, Adams and Somer-Topcu 
(2009) show that regarding positional shifts, parties are more responsive to parties from the same 
ideological camp. The same has been observed for strategies of issue emphasis. Left-wing parties 
are more likely to take up the issues emphasized by other left-wing parties in general (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014) and by green parties in particular (Spoon et al., 2014). It is argued 
that this effect is due to the similar issue preferences of the actors in the same political camp. In 
fact, they might pose more of an “electoral threat” (Spoon et al., 2014: 363) to each other as they 
compete for similar constituencies. Closely related to ideological affinity, the literature discusses 
the distinction between mainstream and niche parties. According to Adams et al. (2006), niche 
parties are characterized by their non-centrism on economic left-right issues, and the results indi-
cate that niche parties do not consistently respond to general shifts in public opinion. As Klüver 
and Spoon (2014: 6) argue, niche parties are “classic policy seekers, who value their policy goals 
over any office considerations.” Therefore, they seem less likely to follow signals from the general 
population but are more sensitive to their constituency and the issues that they care about the most 
(see also Ezrow et al., 2011). 
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How can we apply these ideas to the particular signal sent by protesters? It is important to 
note that the protest signal is usually negative and it comes with a political “bias.” That is, a large 
majority of the protests that are reported in the media demand economically left-wing and/or cul-
turally libertarian solutions to a certain problem (Hutter, 2014b). Thus, we study responses to pro-
tests that correspond more to the preferences of left-wing parties. Many studies show that left-right 
ideological orientations are positively related to support by citizens or representatives for involve-
ment in protest. Using multi-level models in their eighty-seven-country study, Dalton et al. (2010: 
69), for example, show that the effect of left-wing ideology is magnified by the democratic and 
economic development of a state. Thus, the effects are most pronounced in established and affluent 
democracies – that is, the countries on which we focus in our study. Therefore, we expect that left-
wing parties are more responsive to protests than right-wing parties. They might act as institutional 
allies of social movements because they are more likely to share the demands of the protesters. At 
the same time, they might also risk more if they ignore the ‘electoral threat’ posed by sustained 
news coverage of protests on behalf of people that are very likely to belong to their support base. 
Moreover, the protest signal should correspond more to the preferences of radical political 
parties. As March and Mudde (2005: 24) rightly state, both the left-right distinction and the term 
‘radical’ are “a potential terminological minefield.” However, following their suggestion, we use 
the term ‘radical’ to label “an ideological and practical orientation towards ‘root and branch’ sys-
temic change of the political system.” As Mudde (2007: 26) argues in his book on the populist 
radical right, radical involves “opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy.” While rad-
ical (left- or right-wing) parties are thus opposed to liberal democracy, they are not anti-democratic 
per se. However, they advocate profound political change and are more critical of existing repre-
sentative channels of interest intermediation. Therefore, we expect that radical political parties are 
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more responsive to the challengers active in the protest arena, who often share their views, than 
moderate political parties. 
Protests in the news – like any other type of external signal – might not just trigger responses 
from ideologically close or radical allies, however. The literature on party strategies finds addi-
tional factors that influence the extent to which parties are responsive to such signals. A key factor 
seems to be the different strategic incentives faced by opposition and government parties. First, 
opposition parties are less constrained by their past activities or external factors, such as economic 
conditions or international commitments. Second, opposition parties might have more incentives 
to be responsive to citizens’ demands to (re)gain control of the government. Supporting this idea, 
Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011) indicate that, in general, parties in opposition are more likely to 
take up media signals than parties in government. The opposition responds to media signals be-
cause they offer “potential ammunition” (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011: 324) with which to 
attack the government. Similarly, Klüver and Spoon (2014) show that, regarding issue emphasis in 
their election manifestos, government parties are less responsive to voters’ issue priorities than 
opposition parties. This mirrors earlier arguments in the political process approach about why op-
position parties should facilitate protest mobilization more than government parties (Kriesi et al., 
1995; Maguire, 1995). Although the opposition cannot offer any substantial concessions to social 
movements, it is not bound by the constraints of established policies and the diverse societal forces 
that government parties need to take into account. Moreover, it might want to build broad social 
coalitions for electoral purposes. Overall, this suggests that parties are more likely to respond to 
the signals of protests in the news when in opposition. 
At the same time, the literature on party competition stresses that not all parties might profit 
from emphasizing the same issues. Some parties are considered to be more capable of dealing with 
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certain issues or they are more likely to be associated with them. This idea is at the heart of the 
issue ownership theory (e.g. Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave et al., 2012). One way in which a party seeks 
to establish ‘associative’ or ‘issue ownership competence’ is by talking as much as possible about 
the issues it owns. Therefore, the responsiveness literature and work on the media’s agenda-setting 
effect expect that actors react more to signals from their environment if these concern their ‘own’ 
issues. Klüver and Spoon (2014) confirm that niche parties – a classic type of ‘associative issue 
owners’ – are more likely to respond to changing issue priorities in the electorate if they concern 
their preferred issue. Moreover, Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011) show that parties react more to 
general media coverage of their issues than to coverage of other issues. Again, this can be translated 
into varying effects of the protest signal. If protests in the news relate to a matter for which a certain 
party claims ownership, that party should be more likely to respond to the protest. This response 
can be either accommodative (taking up the position of the protesters) or adversarial (attacking the 
position of the protesters) – but there should be a reply. 
Finally, the literature on party strategies shows that competitors’ actions play a significant 
role in determining what parties do. To a certain extent, this perspective complements the issue 
ownership approach with its focus on why parties selectively emphasize certain issues and ignore 
others. As Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) argue, issue ownership offers only a partial view 
of party issue competition as there is a kind of “party system agenda” (see also Dolezal et al., 2014; 
and Wagner and Meyer, 2014). This systemic agenda is in large part due to the reactions of parties 
to the behaviour of their competitors. As Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015) argue, it is “diffi-
cult for parties to completely ignore issues that other parties talk about.” This process can be mod-
elled like a contagion or ‘riding the wave’ process. If a certain issue gets emphasized by some 
parties, others react. Therefore, apart from just emphasizing their issues, parties react to each other 
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and might want to ride the wave by focusing on those issues that are currently high on other agen-
das, such as those of the electorate or the media in general. Given our main independent variable, 
it seems important that the protest signal in the media leads to some initial reactions by other parties 
so that additional parties react. Again, studies on the reactions of mainstream parties to the issues 
emphasized by niche parties indicate that challengers can make a difference by initiating such a 
‘contagion process’ – as shown by Spoon et al. (2014) for environmental issues and by van de 
Wardt (2014) for immigration and European integration. 
To sum up, we formulate the following five hypotheses about partisan moderators of the 
influence of protests on the parliamentary agenda of parties: 
H1. Left-wing parties are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest than right-wing par-
ties (left-wing hypothesis) 
H2. Radical parties are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest than moderate parties 
(radical hypothesis) 
H3. Parties in opposition are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest than parties in 
government (opposition hypothesis) 
H4. Parties are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest over their ‘own’ issues than 
over other issues (issue ownership hypothesis) 
H5. Parties are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest if their competitors have re-
sponded recently (contagion hypothesis) 
 
Data and methods 
We rely on data from the following countries and periods to test our hypotheses: France (1995-
2005), the Netherlands (1995-2011), Spain (1996-2011) and Switzerland (1995-2003). The coun-
tries are partly selected because of the availability of data. All are West-European democracies 
with a tradition of protest, free media, elections and accountable government. At the same time, 
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the countries differ in both the general institutional opportunities faced by social movements and 
the rules that regulate parliamentary questions. We adopt a most different systems design as we are 
interested in common patterns in the protest-party interactions across the various settings in which 
these interactions might take place. We rely on existing data from the Comparative Agendas Pro-
ject (CAP) to assess the agendas of political parties in the four countries. To be precise, we look at 
the issues that political parties address in their parliamentary questions. We rely on oral questions 
for France and Spain, and on written questions for the Netherlands (500 questions per parliamen-
tary year, a 30% stratified sample3) and Switzerland. While the role and function of parliamentary 
questions differ across countries (Wiberg 1995), we have selected for each country the type of 
question that is as equivalent as possible and that has enough variation. Earlier research has shown 
that such questions can be fruitfully combined in a single analysis (Vliegenthart et al. 2016). In all 
the countries included in our analysis, questions are asked both by opposition and government 
parties and parties face few constraints in putting them on the table. A total number of more than 
29,000 parliamentary questions is included in the analysis. All this material is coded according to 
the major policy categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (see below). We only include 
parties that received at least two percent of the vote in the last parliamentary elections, making a 
total of 29 parties included in parts of or the whole research period. 
To assess the protest agenda and its issue content, we rely on protest event analysis (PEA), a 
particular type of quantitative content analysis. By doing so, we follow a long-standing tradition in 
research on social movements and contentious politics (for a recent overview, see Hutter, 2014a). 
Compared to survey data, the other primary source for tracing the development of protest, PEA is 
far better suited to measuring the issues of protest, i.e. the key variable of interest in agenda-setting 
                                                          
3
 Practical considerations constrained the data coding in the Netherlands. The sample of 30 percent, however, is sub-
stantial and the total number of coded questions for the Netherlands is comparable with those of the other countries.  
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research. In this study, we rely on protest event data collected by Kriesi et al. (2012) in the project 
National Political Change in a Globalizing World. These data are an updated and extended version 
of the data used by Kriesi et al. (1995) to study new social movements in Western Europe. The 
data themselves comes from one national quality newspaper per country. This results in a dataset 
covering 4,925 protest events in the four countries, involving around 49 million participants. The 
newspapers covered are Le Monde (France), NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), El Pais (Spain), and 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland).4 
PEA generally – and Kriesi et al.’s sampling strategy more precisely – has been an object of 
criticism in the literature and researchers still disagree on how problematic the selection bias of 
newspaper data is. No one would claim that the events covered in the Monday editions of a national 
newspaper are a representative sample of all protests taking place in a given country. However, the 
factors that predict whether the news media cover a protest event or not have been empirically 
assessed. These are event characteristics (especially size, violence and organizational sponsors), 
the type of media outlet (especially the ideological and regional orientation of the newspaper) and 
issue characteristics (especially media attention cycles) (Earl et al., 2004). In general, studies report 
                                                          
4
 The dataset is based on coding of the Monday editions of these newspapers. The choice of Monday edi-
tions was dictated by the need to reduce the work of collecting a large number of events over a long period 
of time, and also because the Monday edition covers events during the weekend. Since protest activities 
tend to be concentrated on weekends, the dataset includes a high proportion of all the protests occurring 
during the period under study. All the events covered in the Monday editions were coded, including those 
taking place a week before or after the publication date. This is why around twenty-five percent of all the 
coded events occurred on weekdays. 
14 
 
 
the strongest effects for event characteristics. Since we cannot totally avoid biases and are particu-
larly interested in trends and differences, the present data are based on the idea of making the bias 
“as systematic as possible” (Koopmans, 1995: 271).5 
Furthermore, there are good reasons for assuming that if we cannot establish an effect of 
media-covered protests on party agendas, it would be even less possible to uncover a direct unme-
diated agenda-setting effect of protest. As stated in the introduction, the decisive interactions be-
tween protests and political elites take place to a large extent – if not exclusively – through the 
mass media (Koopmans, 2004). Party officials usually get their information about protest events 
from the media. Moreover, although media-based accounts of protest come with the price of selec-
tion bias, precisely these event characteristics that increase the chances that protests get into the 
news might also increase the chances that political parties perceive the protest signal as a potential 
electoral threat and therefore respond to it. 
As the two datasets were collected for different purposes, an important step was the matching 
of issue categories. We follow the strategy used by Vliegenthart et al. (2015). More precisely, the 
protest event data employed in this paper initially identified 103 protest ‘goals’. The goal variable 
combined information on the issue and the position of a given protest event (e.g. against nuclear 
energy, against racism). Following the general approach of the agenda-setting literature, 
Vliegenthart et al. (2015) merge the different positions and recode the specific issue categories in 
                                                          
5
 The newspapers were chosen with respect to six criteria: continuous publication throughout the research 
period, daily publication, high quality, comparability with regard to political orientation (none is very con-
servative or extremely left-wing), coverage of the entire national territory, and similar selectivity when 
reporting on protest events. While the cross-national and longitudinal stability in the patterns of selection 
bias is still a contested topic, recent studies show that the sampling strategy used here scores well in com-
parison with more widely encompassing strategies of data collection (see McCarthy et al., 2008; Hutter, 
2014b: 147ff.). Most importantly, the results show that the national ebbs and flows of protest mobilization 
in general and of individual issues more specifically are accurately traced with this sampling strategy. 
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the protest event data to fit the CAP major issue categories (which total 19 categories for political 
agendas). The issues of the coded protest events fall into 17 different CAP categories (16 for Spain, 
where immigration is excluded as a major category). These 17 categories are used in the analysis 
and listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In general, it should be noted that by bringing together 
two different datasets and by not cherry-picking types of issue (e.g. main protest issues or new 
issues), it would already seem noteworthy if we could establish some significant relationship be-
tween the general issue areas emphasized in the protest arena and those emphasized in the parlia-
mentary one. 
Our dependent variable is the attention party x pays to issue y in month z – in terms of the 
share of the total number of parliamentary questions this party tables that month. Our main inde-
pendent variable is the monthly share of protest activities for an issue from the total number of 
protest activities that month. Here, we use the average of the previous three months (lags 1, 2 and 
3) since we assume that protest signals might take some time before they reach the institutional 
political arena (for a similar argument, see Walgrave et al., 2008). This is all the more true given 
the skewed distribution of this variable, which has a mean value of .011 with a standard deviation 
of .047 and 89 percent zero values. To test our hypotheses, we focus in particular on the interaction 
of this protest variable with the various party characteristics discussed in the previous section. To 
classify political parties into ‘left vs. right’ and ‘radical vs. moderate’, we rely on two different 
approaches. One main operationalization relies on the categorization of individual parties into party 
families as proposed by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al., 2006; 
Volkens et al., 2013). This classify parties into ten party families: communists, ecologists, social 
democrats, liberals, Christian democrats, conservatives, populist radical right, agrarians, ethnic-
regionalists, and special issue parties. For our analyses, parties that belong to the communist, ecol-
ogist or social democratic family are coded as ‘left-wing,’ and parties that belong to the communist 
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and populist right family are coded as ‘radical.’ The other operationalization relies on the actual 
coding of the manifestos and uses the left-right scale (rile) of the CMP data.6 More precisely, we 
code all parties with a negative value as ‘left-wing’ and all those with a rile measure that is one 
standard deviation either below or above average as ‘radical.’ The opposition/government status is 
based on whether a party is part of the national government or not at the time when a question is 
asked in parliament. To measure issue ownership, we again rely on the party families. To date, 
there is no established method to determine issue ownership and no comparative datasets exist that 
contain such measures. Therefore, party family labels are often used as proxies because they tend 
to reflect fairly well the issues with which parties are typically associated (e.g. Wagner and Meyer, 
2014). Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the party families and the issue categories that they ‘own.’ 
Finally, the ‘contagion’ variable (a count variable) indicates how often other parties talked about a 
given issue in the previous month if there was a protest event related to the issue. 
Our observations are not independent. First of all, temporal dependency is present. We take 
this into consideration by adding a lagged dependent variable and a variable that captures the lagged 
attention of other parties to the same issue. Second, the observations are nested in both parties and 
issues. These two entities are not necessarily hierarchically ordered. Therefore, we rely on a cross-
classified (instead of a multilevel) model (with restricted maximum likelihood estimation) that ac-
counts for this double nesting. In the first model (random intercept), we only allow the intercept to 
vary across issues and parties. In the following models (random slopes), the effect of protest is also 
considered to differ across issues and parties. We try to account for this variation by including 
interactions between protest and (mainly) party characteristics, as well as issue characteristics (e.g. 
                                                          
6
 The rile measure is based on all 57 policy categories in the CMP codebook. It is calculated by subtracting the per-
centage of thirteen ‘left’ categories from the percentage of thirteen ‘right’ categories. The other ‘neutral’ categories 
are also taken into account as these percentages are based on all categories. 
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issue ownership). Finally, our observations are nested in countries. We include fixed effects (i.e. 
dummy variables for all countries minus one) to account for this. 
 
Empirical findings 
In Table 1, we present the results of the regression analysis. The first model contains all the main 
effects. Apart from our variables of interest, we also include the following control variables: the 
lagged value of a party’s own agenda, the lagged value of the agenda of all parties, and the size of 
the party measured by its vote share.7 The second model tests the dependency of the effect of protest 
on party attention based on ideological characteristics (left and radical). The third model focuses 
on dependency on party competition and more dynamic factors (issue ownership, government/op-
position distinction, and contagion). The fourth model combines the two approaches, and Table 2 
presents additional models that focus on opposition parties in particular. 
Regarding the two ideological factors, our findings are mixed at best. The second model in 
Table 1 indicates that left-wing parties tend to be more likely to respond to news coverage of protest 
than right-wing parties. This finding confirms our first hypothesis and mirrors other studies, as 
political parties are more likely to react to signals coming from the same ideological camp (e.g. 
Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014; Spoon et al., 2014). By 
contrast, we do not find the expected effect when comparing radical parties with moderate parties. 
As shown in Table 1, the interaction effect for radical parties and protest is statistically insignificant 
and even negative (disconfirming hypothesis 2). Thus, once we control for left-wing ideology, 
                                                          
7
 One could consider party size as a variable of substantial interest that might determine the responsiveness of the 
party towards protest: the larger the size, the more resources (personnel) the party has to monitor incoming infor-
mation such as protest activities. Additional analyses suggest that the interaction between party size and protest is 
positive, but only marginally significant (p<.10). Furthermore, excluding party size as a control variable does not 
substantially change any of the other results (see Table A2 in the Appendix for detailed results). 
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radical parties are as likely to respond to protests in the media as moderate parties. If there is an 
effect of being radical on how responsive parties are to the protest signal, this seems to be due to 
the behaviour of radical parties from the left but not from the right. However, the results of Model 
4 indicate that the effect of sharing the left-libertarian preferences of most protesters is only mar-
ginally significant if we take into account other factors that are expected to influence parties’ strat-
egies of issue emphasis. Most importantly, if we consider opposition status, the response of left-
wing parties is no longer that different to that of right-wing parties. We only find a marginally 
significant interaction of the protest agenda and being a member of a left-wing party family if we 
include an interaction with opposition status (again, see Model 4 in Table 1), and it is not significant 
if we run the analysis only for opposition parties (see Table 2). Moreover, considering the alterna-
tive operationalisations of left and radical based on the rile measure does not yield any substantial 
results (see the methods section and Table A3 in the Appendix), and neither does the exclusion of 
one of the interaction terms from the final analysis (Table A4 in the Appendix). Overall, the results 
indicate a limited influence of ideological factors in determining the responsiveness of MPs to 
protest.  
 
<Table 1> 
 
The results in Table 1 support our third ‘opposition hypothesis’. Political parties in opposition 
are more likely to respond to the signals of media-covered protests than parties in government. This 
effect also holds if we take the ideological orientation of parties into account. The opposition seems 
to use the signals received from protesters as a way to challenge the government in parliament and 
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to show its responsiveness to societal demands more generally. This mirrors findings on party re-
sponses to changing voter preferences and general media attention (Klüver and Spoon, 2014; 
Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011), and it supports the claim from the political process approach in 
social movement research that opposition parties are key sponsors and facilitators of large-scale 
protest mobilization (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1995; Maguire, 1995). 
Moreover, our results provide evidence for the ‘contagion’ or ‘riding the wave’ idea. As 
shown in Table 1 (Models 3 and 4), parties are more likely to respond to news coverage of protest 
if their competitors in the party system have already started to talk about the protesters’ issue the 
previous month. This also holds for the subset of opposition parties (see Table 2). By contrast, we 
cannot establish a significant link between issue ownership and responses to protests. In general, 
parties do not tend to be more likely to respond to protests related to issues for which they claim 
ownership. This is somewhat surprising given the perceived importance of issue ownership for the 
responsiveness of political parties to incoming signals. To further explore the potential importance 
of ownership, we conduct an additional analysis in which we look at separate issues that have 
parties from one family as issue owners: agriculture, environment and immigration. The results of 
a multilevel model (months nested in parties) are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix. The 
results show that for one of the three issues, immigration, issue ownership results in a greater re-
sponsiveness by issue owners. For the other two issues this is not the case. Taken together, these 
findings support recent research that emphasises that issue ownership offers a relatively partial 
view of party competition, as parties react to each other and have incentives to take up the issues 
raised by their competitors (e.g. Dolezal et al.,2014; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010, 2015; 
Wagner and Meyer, 2014). 
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< Table 2 > 
 
Finally, in Figure 1 we present the main interaction effects between our partisan moderators 
and protest to illustrate the substantive significance of our results. The figures report the interaction 
between (a) government/opposition and protest and (b) contagion and protest resulting from mod-
els that in both instances only include the single interaction. Figure 1a again shows that opposition 
parties tend to be more likely to respond to a strong protest signal than government parties, but that 
the predicted values for government and opposition parties only differ significantly if protest takes 
high values, which only occurs under somewhat exceptional circumstances: only in 2.1 percent of 
the cases is the relative protest attention for a single issue higher than .4.  Additionally, government 
parties seem to respond to increased protest attention by asking fewer questions about the issue, 
but the coefficient for this effect is not significant. Figure 2b shows the corresponding contagion 
effect: the more other competitors in the party system have already picked up the protest issue, the 
more a party responds to it (Figure 1b). This effect already results in significantly different predic-
tions at relatively low values of protest. At the same time, the relative protest attention to a single 
issue is only 3.8% higher than .1. Overall, the relatively small size of the effects shown in Figure 
2 indicates that the agenda-setting power of protest and the reactions of parties should not be over-
stated: the changes in parliamentary attention due to protest are modest. For opposition parties, for 
example, a protest agenda that focuses on a single issue in the previous three months increases the 
overall share of that issue on the party’s agenda by 4%. 
 
<Figure 1> 
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Conclusion 
In this study, we have followed recent calls to bridge the gap between research on political parties 
and research on social movements and protest politics. Our study has offered another attempt to 
unravel this complex and dynamic interaction by looking at the effects of protest politics on the 
issues emphasized by parties. More precisely, we have adopted an agenda-setting approach and 
traced issue attention in protests covered in the media and questions raised in parliament over sev-
eral years in four West European countries (i.e. France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). 
Compared to previous attempts to assess the agenda-setting power of protest, the present study has 
innovated by (a) focusing on the responses of the various parties in parliament and (b) taking into 
account party characteristics that might condition the effect of protest signals on parliamentary 
activity. By doing this, we have linked research on protest-party interactions with research about 
how parties respond to other types of external signals, such as those sent by voters, the media or 
competitors in the party system (e.g. Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 
2010, 2015; Klüver and Spoon, 2014; Meguid, 2005; Spoon et al., 2014; Vliegenthart and Wal-
grave, 2011; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). 
Overall, we can draw two important conclusions from our findings. First, political parties 
respond to protest coverage in the media. Thus, parties seem to be responsive to the signals sent 
out by highly mobilized crowds on the streets. We find a significant, although small, effect of the 
protest agenda on the party agendas in parliament. We consider that even this small effect is note-
worthy. Parties face a large variety of environmental signals and are also constrained in the amount 
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of attention they can devote to each issue, due to (internal) regulations and limited time and re-
sources. Moreover, the data used in this paper were collected for different purposes and matching 
the issue categories was a challenge that we could only solve by focusing on fairly broad issue 
categories. The focus on such broad issue areas might actually hide stronger effects of protests 
related to very specific topics on parliamentary activity concerning the same topic. Furthermore, 
by using lagged values of the protest variable, while also controlling for the past of the parliamen-
tary questions series, our models offer a solid basis for causal claims. 
Second, it is not just ideologically close allies that take up matters that are emphasized in the 
protest arena; instead, party responses seem to be driven by the dynamics of party competition 
more generally. That is, although we find that parties from the left are more likely to respond to 
protests covered in the news than parties from the right, if we take into account opposition status 
this effect is no longer statistically significant. What we find is that (a) parties in opposition are 
more likely to respond to news coverage of protest than parties in government, and (b) parties are 
more likely to respond to news coverage of protests if other parties have already responded to the 
issue emphasized by the protesters. This last finding supports the idea of Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen (2010, 2015) that issue ownership offers only a partial view of party issue competition 
because parties take up the issues emphasized by their competitors. In our analysis, we have also 
not been able to find a general effect of issue ownership on how parties react to news coverage of 
protest. However, we find instances of “associative issue ownership” (Walgrave et al. 2012), as the 
populist radical right in parliament seems to respond to the salience of migration-related protests 
in the news. This confirms Klüver and Spoon’s (2014) finding that certain niche parties (in their 
case, the greens) are more responsive to external signals related to the issue that they own. 
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As stated before, our approach is only a first, although crucial, step in understanding the 
dynamic interaction of protest and party politics. It is crucial because catching the attention of 
political decision-makers is often a first step triggering more profound changes. By responding to 
protests, parties can show that they are responsive to (certain) societal demands and the issues of 
the day. Agenda setting offers an extremely powerful tool to capture these protest effects: paying 
attention to issues is a first but necessary step for further political action and potential policy 
change. Further research in the agenda-setting tradition should focus more on whether and how 
different parties respond to protests by other means, for example by emphasizing protest issues in 
their manifestos or by responding to them with legislative activities. In addition, future research 
should address how the impact of protests might differ depending on the electoral cycle or more 
long-term evolutions in the party system, and also take a wider range of party responses beyond 
just parliamentary questions into consideration. For example, our finding that radical parties are 
not more likely to respond to news coverage of protests might only hold for their parliamentary 
activity. By contrast, it might well be that they attempt to align with challengers on the streets 
during electoral campaigns. Similarly, it is interesting to note that we have not been able to establish 
a link between protests over environmental issues and the agenda of green parties in parliament. 
On the one hand, the difference to the findings of Klüver and Spoon (2014) might be due to the 
fact that they study responses in electoral manifestos, whereas we have looked at parliamentary 
activity between elections. Additionally, they look at the general policy priorities of voters, while 
we have focused on protest activities. On the other hand, it might also be caused by their focus on 
the whole period from the early 1970s to 2011. This period includes the advent of green parties in 
Western Europe, whereas our study has concentrated on the period from the mid-1990s to the late 
2000s. Overall, this paper has offered a first, but important, step in this quest to understand the 
contingencies of protest effects on party politics. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Impact of party characteristics on the agenda-setting influence of protest (all observations) 
 
Model 1 
(main effects –  
random intercept) 
Model 2 
(ideology) 
Model 3 
(party competition) 
Model 4 
(all) 
 
Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month lag) 0.065 0.004 *** 0.036 0.004 *** 0.035 0.004 *** 0.035 0.004 *** 
All parties’ agenda (1 
month lag) 0.136 0.010 *** 0.091 0.010 *** 0.083 0.010 *** 0.083 0.010 *** 
             
Protest agenda (3 months 
average lag) 0.060 0.009 *** -0.009 0.021 n.s. -0.097 0.023 *** -0.113 0.027 *** 
             
Party size 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 ***. 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 
Left-wing 0.051 0.030 + 0.005 0.002 *    0.005 0.002 ** 
Radical 0.001 0.003 n.s. 0.001 0.002 n.s.    0.002 0.002 n.s. 
Issue owner 0.005 0.001 ***    0.005 0.004 n.s. 0.005 0.004 n.s. 
Contagion 0.002 0.000 ***    0.001 0.000 * 0.001 0.000 * 
Opposition -0.002 0.001 n.s.    -0.003 0.001 * -0.003 0.001 * 
             
Protest*left-wing    0.070 0.029 *    0.051 0.028 + 
Protest*radical    -0.002 0.036 n.s.    -0.046  0.035 n.s. 
Protest*issue owner       0.031 0.041 n.s. 0.025 0.041 n.s. 
Protest*contagion       0.027 0.003 *** 0.027 0.003 *** 
Protest*opposition       0.107 0.021 *** 0.106 0.021 *** 
 
   
         
Constant 0.025 0.005 *** 0.031 0.004 *** 0.036 0.004 *** 0.033 0.004 *** 
Log restricted-likelihood 49999.602 50477.067  50529.293 50534.476 
 
29 
 
 
Note: N=58,089 (17 issues; 29 parties); + p <.010, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Our main independent variable is the monthly share of protest activities for an issue out of the total number of protest activities that month. We use the 
average of the previous three months (lags 1, 2 and 3) since we assume that protest signals might take some time before they reach the institutional 
political arena. To test our hypotheses, we focus in particular on the interaction of this protest variable with the various party characteristics in bold 
type.
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Table 2: Impact of party characteristics on the agenda-setting influence of protest 
(opposition only) 
 
Model 1 
(main effects – random intercept) 
Model 4 
(all) 
 
Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month lag) 0.075 0.005 *** 0.042 0.005 *** 
All parties’ agenda (1 month 
lag) 0.156 0.013 *** 0.111 0.014 *** 
 
      
Protest agenda (3 months aver-
age lag) 0.090 0.012 *** -0.087 0.035 * 
 
      
Party size 
-0.000 0.000 n.s. 0.000 0.000 * 
Left-wing 0.006 0.004 n.s. 0.006 0.003 * 
Radical 
-0.000 0.043 n.s. 0.003 0.003 n.s. 
Issue owner 0.007 0.002 ** 0.007 0.004 n.s. 
Contagion 0.002 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 n.s. 
 
      
Protest*left-wing 
 
  0.063 0.041 n.s. 
Protest*radical 
 
  -0.048 0.046 n.s. 
Protest*issue owner 
 
  0.052 0.055 n.s. 
Protest*contagion 
 
  0.042 0.005 *** 
 
   
   
Constant 0.024 0.005 *** 0.028 0.004 *** 
Log restricted-likelihood 28017.790 28351.418 
 
Note: N=34,317 (17 issues; 26 parties); + p <.010, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1: Effects of protest on party attention 
a) Opposition vs. government status 
 
b) Contagion by other parties 
 
Note: Lines with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Online Appendix 
Table A1: Issue categories and issue ownership 
Issue Issue Owner 
Macroeconomics Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Democrats 
Civil rights and liberties Liberals, Greens 
Health - 
Agriculture and fishery Agrarians 
Labour and employment Social Democrats, Communists 
Education - 
Environment Greens 
Energy - 
Immigration and integration Populist radical right 
Transportation - 
Law, crime, and family  Conservatives, Christian Democrats 
Social welfare Social Democrats, Communists 
Comm. develop., planning, housing - 
Defence - 
Foreign trade - 
International affairs and foreign aid - 
Government operations - 
 
Note: The matching of the detailed protest issue categories and the major categories of the CAP coding 
scheme was fairly straightforward. However, the two datasets could not be combined at a more detailed 
level as the categories of the protest data are very specific for some issue areas (e.g. civil rights, environ-
ment and defence) but not for others (most importantly, economic issues). This is due to the fact that the 
protest data used in this paper are based on the codebook established by Kriesi et al. (1995) to study new 
social movements in Western Europe. 
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Table A2: The impact of party characteristics on the agenda-setting influence of protest with the ex-
clusion of party size (model 1) and with the inclusion of interaction between party size and protest 
(model 2) 
 
Model 1 
(no party size) 
Model 2 
(party size interaction) 
 
Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month lag) 0.035 0.042 *** 0.035 0.042 *** 
All parties’ agenda (1 month lag) 0.082 0.010 *** 0.083 0.010 *** 
 
      
Protest agenda (3 months average 
lag) -0.111 0.027 *** -0.165 0.041 ***. 
 
      
Party size 
   0.000 0.000 ** 
Left-wing 0.005 0.002 ** 0.005 0.002 * 
Radical 
-0.000 0.002 n.s. 0.002 0.002 n.s. 
Issue owner 0.005 0.004 n.s. 0.005 0.004 n.s. 
Contagion 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 * 
Opposition 
-0.004 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 * 
 
      
Protest*left-wing 0.051 0.028 + 0.050 0.028 + 
Protest*radical 
-0.048 0.035 n.s. -0.022 0.038 n.s. 
Protest*issue owner 0.023 0.041 n.s. 0.034 0.041 n.s. 
Protest*contagion 0.027 0.003 *** 0.027 0.003 *** 
Protest*opposition 0.106 0.021 *** 0.117 0.022 *** 
Protest*party size 
   0.002 0.001 + 
 
   
   
Constant 0.038 0.004 *** 0.030 0.004 *** 
Log restricted-likelihood 50529.705 50535.881 
   
 
Note: N=58,098 (17 issues; 29 parties); + p <.010, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3: The impact of party characteristics on the agenda-setting influence of protest with alterna-
tive operationalization of left-wing and radical 
 
Model 1 
(full model) 
 
Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month lag) 0.034 0.004 *** 
All parties’ agenda (1 month lag) 0.083 0.010 *** 
 
   
Protest agenda (3 months average 
lag) -0.111 0.028 *** 
 
   
Party size 0.000 0.000 ** 
Left-wing 0.005 0.002 * 
Radical 0.002 0.003 n.s. 
Issue owner 0.004 0.004 n.s. 
Contagion 0.000 0.000 * 
Opposition 
-0.003 0.001 * 
 
   
Protest*left-wing 0.014 0.029 n.s. 
Protest*radical 0.024 0.033 n.s. 
Protest*issue owner 0.032 0.041 n.s. 
Protest*contagion 0.027 0.003 *** 
Protest*opposition 0.106 0.021 *** 
 
   
Constant 0.034 0.004 *** 
Log restricted-likelihood 50372.121 
  
 
Note: N=57,596 (17 issues; 25 parties); + p <.010, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4: The impact of party characteristics on the agenda-setting influence of protest with sepa-
rate analyses of left and radical interactions 
 
Model 1 
(left interaction) 
Model 2 
(radical interaction) 
 
Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month lag) 0.036 0.004 *** 0.036 0.004 *** 
All parties’ agenda (1 month lag) 0.076 0.010 *** 0.076 0.010 *** 
       
Protest agenda (3 months average 
lag) -0.118 0.026 *** -0.094 0.024 *** 
       
Party size 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Left-wing 0.007 0.002 ** 0.007 0.002 ** 
Radical 0.003 0.002 n.s. 0.003 0.002 n.s. 
Issue owner 0.005 0.004 n.s. 0.005 0.004 n.s. 
Contagion 0.001 0.000 * 0.001 0.000 * 
Opposition -0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** 
       
Protest*left-wing 0.042 0.028 n.s.    
Protest*radical    -0.034 0.035 n.s. 
Protest*issue owner 0.029 0.041 n.s. 0.027 0.041 n.s. 
Protest*contagion 0.027 0.003 *** 0.027 0.003 *** 
Protest*opposition 0.104 0.021 *** 0.112 0.021 *** 
 
   
   
Constant 0.030 0.004 *** 0.030 0.004 *** 
Log restricted-likelihood 54280.444 54279.792 
   
 
Note: N=58,098 (17 issues; 29 parties); + p <.010, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.5: The impact of party characteristics and moderation of issue ownership on the agenda-set-
ting influence for specific issues 
 
Model agriculture Model environment Model immigration 
 
Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z Coef. SE P>z 
Party agenda (1 month 
lag) 0.065 0.017 *** 0.034 0.017 *. -0.034 0.019 n.s. 
All parties’ agenda (1 
month lag) 0.057 0.033 + 0.124 0.039 ** 0.139 0.056 * 
          
Protest agenda (3 months 
average lag) 0.050 0.083 n.s. -0.020 0.044 n.s. 0.105 0.056 * 
          
Party size 0.001 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 n.s. 0.000 0.000 n.s. 
Left-wing 0.010 0.006 n.s. 0.004 0.006 n.s. 0.007 0.007 n.s. 
Radical 0.002 0.005 n.s. 0.000 0.007 n.s. -0.012 0.011 n.s. 
Issue owner -0.017 0.008 * 0.010 0.010 n.s. 0.010 0.014 n.s. 
Contagion -0.000 0.001 n.s. 0.001 0.001 n.s. 0.003 0.001 * 
Opposition -0.006 0.004 + -0.007 0.004 + 0.007 0.004 n.s. 
          
Protest*issue owner -0.040 -0.130 n.s. -0.135 0.111 n.s. 0.921 0.444 * 
 
   
   
   
Constant 0.016 0.006 * 0.035 0.008 *** 0.024 0.008 ** 
Log restricted-likelihood 3595.642  3188.955  3111.221 
 
Note: N=3,417 (29 parties) for agriculture and environment, N=2,871 (26 parties) for immigration; + p <.010, 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
